E: Well, I don't pretend that he was a particularly good man. He was a poor man who worked for me. One day at the end of the day while the employees were all getting drunk. He got into a brawl with one of our servants, and this man won, killing the servant. So my father flew into a rage and tied him hand and foot. He threw him into a ditch and left him there for days on end while he went to ask the police what he should do about it. This man died a slow death of hunger and exposure.
S: You're testifying against your father for killing a loser like that? E: That's exactly what the rest of my family say too, Socrates. They think that it is impious, it is 
What is piety?
E: Ah, I see what you mean. Alright then I'll tell you. S: So this means it would do no good to try to reduce you to absurdity by saying that since the gods themselves will different things, and since you think that what is pious is that which the gods will and what is impious is that which the gods will against, you are thereby committed to the view that some actions are both pious and impious. E: Well, you might have said that if I were a polytheist and if I also believed that the gods disagreed with each other, but as it is, you can't use that argument. E: Indeed! I said that rightness is that quality of being willed by God. We talk this way about other things. For example, the morning star is the evening star, because it is the same thing.
S: That it is.
E: But once we have announced that fact, we would think a man very odd who tried to put us on the spot by saying "Ah, friend, but is it the morning star because it is the evening star? Or is it the evening star because it is the morning star?" 3 To talk of moral rightness or obligation may or may not have been Plato's original intention. Just what he did mean to talk about has been difficult to pin down exactly. However, in the literature written in opposition to a divine command theory of ethics, the dilemma has been framed in terms of what is right, rather than what is pious. 4 Peter Singer engages in just this type of switching between two understandings of a divine command theory when he says: "Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning of "good" is nothing other than 'what God approves'. Plato refuted a similar view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods approval that makes them good." Singer says that there is a claim that "good" just means "what God approves," and then he immediately says that this was the first option Plato refuted when he tackled the claim that divine commands are causal for morality. But those two positions are not the same at all. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 2 nd ed.), 3. 
Morality is not prior to
God's will according to Euthyphro after all E: I suppose you can't say that then, since my view is that God's will causes things to be good. 6 This distinction tends to not be made by the critics of divine command ethics. Instead, the second question is asked, "So would X be right if God commanded it?" The assumption being made by the critic is that the divine command theorist will accept that God could command X, whatever X is.
Would abhorrent actions be right if God willed them?
E: Now, what I was getting at is this. Since God made this world, a world in which he does not will that we torture people, the way he made this world reflects his will, including the way he created us. This includes our intuitive sense of moral outrage at those acts, and it also includes the natural consequences of those acts, the things that torture causes.
S: Do you mean that if God had created a different world, those features of ourselves and of the consequences of torture might be different? E: They certainly could be. S: No doubt, but now notice what you have appealed to, Euthyphro. You are trying to say that actions are right because God commands them, but now you seem to be saying that that something like torture is right or wrong depending on the effect that it has on us, which means that God deems it wrong because it is independently wrong, regardless of whether he commanded it or forbade it. E: No, Socrates, you are assuming too much. But before I pursue that argument, I would like to finish the present argument. We'll call this new argument "the independence argument," and we will come back to it soon. S: Very well, I will wait. E: Thank you. You said two things previously; that my view means that God could command just anything, and that if God commanded torture, it would be right. S: Whether it is true or not I am not sure, but yes, there can be no doubt that it is possibly true.
But I doubt that it is true. E: And why is that? S: I doubt it because it seems to me that if something had consequences so different from torture in this world that it was not wrong, then it would be a kind of word game to call it torture at all. It wouldn't be torturous! E: Well said. In fact, I accept that. I was only trying to show that it is at least conceivable that what is wrong and horrendous in this world might not be so in other worlds. But I too doubt that something like torture would be permissible in other worlds.
S: Oh? Then let us say that your doubts and mine are well founded. Instead of saying that we doubt that torture could be permissible, let us say -even though we accept that it could be permissible in certain worlds -that it is not permissible in any worlds. E: Since I accept that this might be true, very well. Let us say that this is true. E: Then we have found our answer. God cannot command that which he hates, even though it is within his power. Whatever God commands is right, and torture could never be right because God would never command it, nor would his character, his nature and his desire permit him to. For example (and others could be given), if God is benevolent, then he does not command that which is repugnant to benevolence. 7 S: Euthyphro, you have done well. I accept then, that your view does not imply that God could command anything, and it would become right. But in finding this answer, we have gone back to another problem for you.
E: And what problem is that? S: It is the problem that I have agreed to wait for you to discuss. You called it "the independence argument." In order to get away from the view that God obeys another moral law besides himself, you said that whatever God commands is right.
E: Yes, that is what I said.
7 For a defence of the claim that God has a nature and is subject to it see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? The Aquinas Lecture, 1980 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980 S: But look now how you have escaped the problems with that view. When I say that this would mean that God could command terrible things like torture, you say that he could not because he could not condone something as evil as torture! And you are back where I accused you of being before, because you must now say that God really does follow a moral law above himself, a law that forbids torture, and God dutifully obeys by never commanding torture. E: Why Socrates, how quickly words change their meaning in your hands! S: Never, my good friend! This is the plain path that reason draws us down. E: Not so. I have not denied that God has his reasons for commanding as he does. But this does not mean that we must say that God is under a moral law that is outside of himself.
S: What is this strange and marvellous philosophy? Explain, Euthyphro.
E: Let me make sure that I understand your objection, Socrates, so that when I have explained myself you will not complain that I have responded to an argument that you did not make. S: Please do. E: I have said that God has reasons for commanding and forbidding as he does. I have also said that the reason that actions are right is that God commands them, and the reason actions are wrong is that God forbids them. 8 S: This much is clear to us both. E: Very good. And you think that this means that the reason that an action is right is actually the reason that God has for commanding it, and the reason an action is wrong is actually the reason that God has for forbidding it, so that God's commands do not change what it right and wrong, as those reasons exist whether God commands or not, and whether he forbids or not. S: You have understood me well. This is just the objection I have. 8 The argument Euthyphro moves into here is an argument that if God has reasons to command this does not mean that he must, morally speaking, command as he does. While Euthyphro's argument that follows is adequate, it may not be the only one available to him. If William Alston is right, then it is not unthinkable that God might -at least sometimeshave moral reasons for commanding as he does. He suggests a distinction between being morally good, and doing what is morally right in the sense of obligatory, a distinction between value and duty. But since my Euthyphro and Alston both agree that God is not subject to moral obligation, Euthyphro does not need to appeal to Alston's argument, even though he could, and since I am not yet sure I can defend Alston's position, I merely note the fact. God commands, and his commands alone may serve that purpose. And so we may say that an action is right if God commands it, and an action is wrong if God forbids it, and this does not mean that God can make just anything right, and in avoiding this charge, we do not make rightness independent of God's commands.
S: This was much easier back in Athens! And so we leave our two friends. Socrates has discovered that when he steps out of Plato's dialogue and into mine, things turn out rather differently for him. While general textbooks or collections of readings or University course texts in undergraduate classes in ethics around the world make passing references to the famous Euthyphro dilemma as though it is a perpetual embarrassment to theologically grounded ethics, they are successful only because they attempt to place the reader in the unfortunate position that Euthyphro is in: in the first place, philosophically unresourceful and not particularly reflective, and secondly, shielded from the responses to the supposed dilemma that have been published since that time. It might be answered in turn that all I have done is to provide Euthyphro with the answers that Socrates did not have access to, and so I did not give him the chance to offer a rebuttal. This is true. However, my point here has not been that there are no further arguments that Socrates could marshalled against the coherence or plausibility of theologically grounded ethics. My point is that the arguments that Socrates did use cannot be simply reprinted or repeated to a class as though they are respectable arguments, and could very easily have been answered by a better informed Euthyphro. And yet, they are simply reprinted and repeated to classes around the world as though they were adequate. As I type this I have sitting on my desk a course text from my own University where the dilemma is presented as a crippling argument against theologically grounded ethics. Likewise, Peter Singer's
